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Determining whether conduct should be criminalised or not, is a serious problem 
because the criminal law is becoming more civilised.  This article explores the living-
standard analysis tool, which provides a systematic decision-making framework rather 
than leaving it to intuition.  This tool is applied to four examples of non-consensual 
photography and distribution, and the results are compared with the criminal law.  This 
comparison indicates that the two do not always coincide.  Over-criminalisation is one 
possible explanation for this discrepancy.  This article recommends further research 




Determining the boundaries of criminal law is a serious problem.  There is a trend of 
criminal law encroaching upon conduct that was ‘previously thought to be civil or 
regulatory in character’.1  The criminal law has been described as a ‘predominantly 
administrative system managing enormous numbers of relatively non-serious and 
“regulatory offences”’.2  Most commentators suggest that there is no unifying factor 
that underpins the decision to criminalise conduct.  For example, Simester and Sullivan 
conclude that ‘the sheer variety of conduct that has been designated a criminal wrong 
defies reduction to any “essential” minimum’.3  Similarly, Findlay, Odgers and Yeo say 
                                                 
*  BBus(Acc) LLB (Hons) GradDip LegalPrac LLM (QUT) PhD candidate (USQ); Lecturer, School of 
Law, QUT. 
1  J C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And What Can 
Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1875. 
2  L Farmer, 'The Obsession with Definition' (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 57, 64-6. 
3  A P Simester and G R Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (Hart, 2nd ed, 2003) 3.  Further, 
McSherry and Naylor contend that: ‘the limits of the criminal law cannot be set by reference to a 
“simple principle”, be it harm, individual liberty or whatever.  Instead the boundaries of the law are 
shaped by a variety of forces that operate as broad guidelines rather than its clear-cut criteria’: B 
McSherry and B Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws: Critical Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 
2004) 22. 
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that there is no simple explanation about why the criminal law has pursued one direction 
and not another.4  Further, Ashworth suggests that the criminal law is ‘unprincipled and 
chaotic’ and questions whether the criminal law is a ‘lost cause’.5  Arguably, the 
development of criminal law has been unpredictable because of a ‘fundamental 
ambiguity of its central organising principles’.6  Several policies or principles may be 
selected during a value laden selection process to justify criminalisation.7  In any event, 
the boundaries of criminal law are based on rationality and justice and not merely 
chance or contingency.8   
 
Whether non-consensual photography and distribution falls within the boundaries of 
criminal law is a live issue.  In this article I have chosen non-consensual photography 
and distribution over other examples of criminal conduct because it is topical in the 21st 
century.9  Many jurisdictions have provided a legislative response to this conduct in the 
21st century.10  Further, recent media reports (some of which are discussed below) are 
littered with examples of this conduct, and it has been said that the community is 
outraged by such conduct.11  While non-consensual photography is not a new 
phenomenon, the means of photographing and distributing such photographs have 
become more sophisticated with the advent of digital cameras,12 mobile phone cameras, 
video cameras, web cams and the Internet.  To determine whether these examples of 
non-consensual photography and distribution should be criminalised, this article will 
apply a living-standard analysis.   
 
von Hirsch and Jareborg created the living-standard analysis tool, which gauged the 
seriousness of criminal harm.13  Their approach is normative because it indicates how 
offences ‘should’ be rated.14  They restricted themselves to conduct that was already 
                                                 
4  M Findlay, S Odgers and S Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2005) 
12. 
5  A Ashworth, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 The Law Quarterly Review 225, 225. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo, above n 4, 12. 
8  Ibid. 
9  As mentioned below, the living-standard analysis tool does not apply to victimless crimes.  It only 
applies where the victim is identifiable.  Thus, this article will consider examples of non-consensual 
photography and distribution where the victim is identifiable. 
10  For example see Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G-N, which came into effect in December 2006; 
Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A-C, which came into effect in December 2005; Criminal Code (Can) s 
162, which came into effect in November 2005; Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67, which came 
into effect in May 2004; and Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G-H, which came into effect in 
March 2004. 
11  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary 
Privacy Issues (2005) 9 <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005. 
12  There is a trend to embed small cameras in everyday objects, for example, teddy bears, clocks, 
smoke detectors, exit signs and pens: C Calvert and J Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the 
Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law 
Journal 469, 480. 
13  A von Hirsch and N Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis' (1991) 11 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1.  See also M Treip, 'Re-Thinking the Study of Criminal Law?' 
(1992) 55 The Modern Law Review 733.  The definition of ‘living standard’ used in this work is 
much broader than that used by economists.  It refers to ‘the degree of economic affluence or 
want…[and] non-economic capabilities that affect personal well-being’: A von Hirsch and N 
Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 7. 
14  von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 13, 6. 
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criminalised, for example, homicide, assault, battery, petty assault, armed robbery, 
forcible rape, date rape, burglary with ransacking, common residential burglary and auto 
theft because they were interested in sentencing policy.15  However, they recognised 
that the living-standard analysis could be employed to determine whether conduct 
should be criminalised.16  None of the literature attempts to apply the living-standard 
analysis tool to determine whether conduct should be criminalised.  Thus, in this article 
I will fill a gap in the literature by applying the living-standard analysis tool to 
determine whether non-consensual photography and distribution should be criminalised 
or not. 
 
In this article I will conclude with a comparison between the results of the living-
standard analysis tool and the black letter law pertaining to non-consensual photography 
and distribution. 
 
II EXAMPLES OF NON-CONSENSUAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
Non-consensual photography and distribution is not a new phenomenon.  In 1890, 
Warren and Brandeis anticipated the need to protect privacy from people that make 
surreptitious and instantaneous photographs.17  More explicitly, the literature 
approximately 100 years later discusses an incident where a female, who was leaving a 
funhouse with her two children, was photographed when an air jet unexpectedly blew 
her skirt up in the air, such that her underwear was visible in the photograph.18  The 
photographer published the photograph on the front page of a newspaper.  As a result of 
this, the female was ‘embarrassed, self-conscious, upset…was known to cry on 
occasions’19 and brought an action on the basis that her privacy had been invaded.  The 
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the female had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the circumstances because the intrusion was indecent, vulgar, embarrassing 
and without the female’s volition.20  This incident occurred in the 1960s, but numerous 
incidents of non-consensual photography and distribution have been reported beyond 
2000. 
 
The Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General highlights several prominent 
instances of photographing and distributing non-consensual photographs in its 
Discussion Paper.21  One of these instances involved photographing children at South 
Bank Parklands in Brisbane without the knowledge or permission of their parents.22  
                                                 
15  von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 13, 3 and 24-8. 
16  Ibid. 
17  S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193, 195 and 211. 
18  A McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in 
Public Places' (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1045; L Rothenberg, 'Re-thinking Privacy: 
Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space' (1999-2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127, 
1148; and Calvert and Brown, above n 12, 490. 
19  Calvert and Brown, above n 12, 490. 
20  Daily Times Democrat v Graham 276 Ala 380 (1964).  Note that this is a civil case and not a 
criminal case. 
21  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, above n 11, 5-6.  
22  Ibid.  See further: ‘Parents Warned over Online Beach Photos’, The Age (Melbourne), 27 January 
2005. 
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When the children were covertly photographed, they were dressed in swimmers and 
playing in a public park.  The images were brought to the media’s attention when they 
were uploaded on a website.  The website had no links to pornography or paedophilia, 
but the author of the website removed the website after media exposure.  At the time of 
the incident, the conduct was not criminalised in Queensland, but the media claimed the 
community was outraged by such conduct.23  However, the media did not support their 
claim with any evidence, especially not empirical evidence.  Further instances discussed 
in the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Discussion Paper include 
covertly photographing Melbourne school boys dressed in half of their rowing suits,24 
and a 16 year old surf lifesaver.25  Similar instances have occurred outside Australia, for 
example, in New Zealand, a man filmed school girls walking along a public street, 
through a gap in a curtain in a bus parked on a public street.26  In these examples, there 
was no pre-existing relationship between the person taking the photograph and the 
subject.  Further, although the subjects in these instances were children, children are not 
the only subjects of non-consensual photographs. 
 
Several incidents of covert filming targeted females doing every day activities in places 
that may be accessed by the public.  For example, photographing topless female bathers 
at a public beach,27 photographing up the skirts of females while they are in shopping 
malls,28 and covertly photographing a female dressed in outer clothing sitting on a step 
outside a Canadian building and subsequently publishing it in a magazine.29  In contrast 
to these instances involving places accessible by the public, other instances have 
involved more private settings and more embarrassing circumstances.  In particular, the 
2004 New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper highlights incidents such as covertly 
filming teenage girls undressing in their bedroom, filming boys undressing using a 
hand-held camera behind a one-way window, installing a camera in a dressing room to 
film female performers, filming a woman trying on a swimsuit at a market changing 
                                                 
23  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, above n 11, 12.  
24  Ibid 5.  See further: ‘Vic-Police Powerless to Act on Gay Website Containing Schoolboys’, 
Australian Associated Press (Australia), 22 February 2002. 
25  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, above n 11, 5. 
26 New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper (2004) 41 
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz> at 6 January 2006; Police v R (20 February 2004) District Court 
Dunedin, (Judge O’Driscoll).  Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34 is an analogous New Zealand 
case, which involved covertly photographing and publishing the photographs in a magazine of a 
celebrity’s children wearing outer clothing in a public place. 
27  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, above n 11, 19.  See further: K Burton, 'Erosion at the 
Beach: Privacy Rights Not Just Sand' (2006) 11 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 216; 'Topless 
Photos Prove Costly', Herald Sun (Sydney), 2 December 2004; 'Parents Warned Over Online Beach 
Photos', above n 22. 
28  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, above n 11, 19.  See further: ‘Victorian Charged Over 
Indecent Schoolies Photos' (2006) ABC News Online (Australia), 22 November 2006; 'Schoolies 
Urged to Look out for Peers', Courier-Mail (Gold Coast), 20 November 2006; Teacher Refused Bail 
in 'Upskirt' Case (2007) News Limited <http://www.news.com.au> at 12 May 2007; Jessica 
Marszalek, 'Peeping Tom, Thieves Target Schoolies', The Australian (Gold Coast), 21 November 
2006; 'Second Man Held Over Snaps of Women at Tennis', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 22 
January 2007; Tram Voyeur 'Filmed Up Skirts' (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au/story> at 9 June 2007; 'Authorities to Ban Photos 'Up Skirts'', Courier 
Mail (Brisbane), 27 May 2007; Crackdown Planned on Pervert Photos (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au/story> at 9 June 2007. 
29  Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa [1998] SCR 591.  JWL, 'HFX OUT HQQ', Halifax Chronicle-Herald 
(Amherst), 29 September 2006.  
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booth, filming women using a tanning salon, filming cheerleaders undressing using a 
video camera behind a two-way mirror and filming females as they used the home 
bathroom of the person making the visual recording.30  Similar incidents have been 
reported in Canada, including a man who filmed his female colleagues using a co-ed 
washroom;31 a man who videotaped his consensual sexual activities with a female, but 
who showed them to his friends at a party without the female’s consent;32 and a 
landlord who installed a video camera in the air vent of a rental apartment tenanted by a 
female.33  This last Canadian incident is analogous to incidents in the United Kingdom 
where landlords fixed spyholes into bathrooms;34 in New South Wales where a man 
filmed his female flatmates whilst they were showering;35 and in Queensland where a 
stepfather filmed his adult stepdaughters showering.36  Another intimate example 
involved a man peeping through a bedroom window and photographing a female while 
she was sleeping.37  In most of these examples, there was a pre-existing relationship 
between the person making the non-consensual visual recording and the subject, but this 
is not always the case. 
 
This article suggests that the key non-consensual photography incidents emerging out of 
the media reports and the discussion papers involve photographing a child playing in a 
public park, photographing a topless female bather at a public beach, up-skirt filming at 
a shopping centre and photographing a housemate as they shower in the bathroom.  This 
article will determine whether these incidents should be criminalised by applying the 
living-standard analysis tool.  The next section of this article outlines the living-standard 
analysis tool. 
 
III LIVING-STANDARD ANALYSIS TOOL 
 
The von Hirsch-Jareborg living-standard analysis tool has merit because it provides a 
systematic framework for determining whether conduct should be criminalised or not, 
rather than making the decision intuitively, impressionistically or ‘on the basis of 
traditional assumptions about the ranking of offences.  The von Hirsch-Jareborg 
                                                 
30 New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper (2004) 2 
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz> at 6 January 2006. 
31  Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence: A Consultation Paper (2002) 1 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca> at 6 January 2006.  This is similar to an example in Hobart, where a 
primary school cleaner drilled a hole in the ceiling of a toilet and installed a camera to view female 
students and teachers using the toilet: Glenn Cordingley, Cleaner Photographs Kids on Toilet (2007) 
News Limited <http://www.news.com.au/story> at 11 May 2007. 
32  Department of Justice Canada, above n 31, 6. 
33  Ibid 1. 
34  United Kingdom Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences (2000) 
12 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk> at 6 January 2006.  Compare Michael A Scarcella, 
'Homeowner's Hidden Camera Helps Send Voyeur to Jail', Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Manatee 
County), 14 August 2006; and R Wacks, 'Home Videos: Is the Surveillance of Domestic Helpers 
Lawful?' (2000) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 49. 
35  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 February 2004 (Ms Angela 
D’Amore). 
36  R v Davies [2004] QDC 279.  This case is similar to an incident reported by the media, where an ex-
policeman filmed two girls showering in his home.  The two girls were aged 9 and 14 years old, and 
the camera was hidden in a towel: Ex-policeman Filmed Girls in Shower (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au> at 18 May 2007. 
37  Rebecca Cavanagh, Snapped Naked While Sleeping (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au/story> at 9 June 2007. 
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approach urges one to dig deeper, and to look more closely at the interests affected’.38  
Under the von Hirsch-Jareborg schema, there are four generic-interest dimensions that 
may be affected by a crime, that is, ‘physical integrity, material support and amenity, 
freedom from humiliation, and privacy and autonomy’.39  Physical integrity ‘embraces 
health, safety, and avoidance of physical pain’.40  Material support and amenity includes 
all types of material interests, for example, food, shelter and luxuries.41  Freedom from 
humiliation encompasses ‘injuries to self-respect that derive from others’ 
mistreatment’.42  Privacy and autonomy ‘promotes self-respect’43 and helps a person to 
pursue various preferences.44  While the list of generic-interest dimensions appears 
compelling, a decision-maker should be aware of its weaknesses.  It is conceded that 
one of the weaknesses with the von Hirsch-Jareborg living-standard tool is that the list 
of generic-interest dimensions is random, incomplete and not based on theory.  The list 
of generic-interest dimensions is based on von Hirsch and Jareborg’s impressions of 
legally protected interests usually involved in victimising crimes.45  Despite this 
weakness, the living-standard analysis tool gives credence to a broad range of interests 
that may be overlooked had the decision to criminalise conduct been made intuitively. 
 
The next step in the von Hirsch-Jareborg living-standard analysis tool is to estimate the 
degree to which the living standard of a typical victim would be affected in a typical 
case.46  In this way, they support a ‘standard harm’ rather than dealing with victims that 
are particularly vulnerable or resilient.47  The living standard does not focus on an 
‘actual life quality or goal achievement, but on the means or capabilities for achieving a 
certain quality of life.  It is also standardized, referring to the means and capabilities that 
would ordinarily help one achieve a good life’.48  Consequently, the living standard can 
be employed without knowing a person’s focal aims or goals.49  Thus, living-standards 
differ from welfare interests because the former is not based on a choice criterion.50  
von Hirsch and Jareborg grade an intrusion into a person’s living-standard at one of four 
levels in descending order as set out in the table below.51  Four levels were chosen 
because the difference between them was reasonably easy to discern.52  A larger 







                                                 
38  A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2006) 39. 
39  von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 13, 19. 
40  Ibid 20. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid 19-20. 
46  Ibid 21. 
47  Ibid 4.  In these cases, principles of aggravation and mitigation would be relevant. 
48  Ibid 10. 
49  Ibid 10-11. 
50  Ibid 11. 
51  Ibid 17. 
52  Ibid. 
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Level Category General Description 
1 ْ Subsistence Survival, but with maintenance of no more than 
elementary human capacities to function. No 
satisfactions presupposed at this level. 
2 ْ Minimal well-being Maintenance of a minimal level of comfort and 
dignity. 
3 ْ Adequate well-being Maintenance of an ‘adequate’ level of comfort and 
dignity. 
4 ْ Enhanced well-being Significant enhancement in quality-of-life above 
the mere ‘adequate’ level. 
 
The terms ‘subsistence’, ‘minimal well-being’, ‘adequate well-being’ and ‘enhanced 
well-being’ emerge in the table above and are worthy of further exploration.  
‘Subsistence’ ‘means barely getting by.  Included would be preservation of one’s major 
physical and cognitive functions, and preservation of a minimal capacity for social 
functioning.’53  ‘Minimal well-being’ provides a ‘minimum level of comfort and 
dignity’.54  While ‘minimal well-being’ offers a better standard of life than 
‘subsistence’, it is still substandard.  ‘Adequate well-being’ refers to a level of comfort 
and dignity that is ‘not leading a substandard or deprived existence’.55  Finally, 
‘enhanced well-being’, is above an ‘adequate well-being’ and ‘addresses those concerns 
that improves someone’s quality-of-life significantly’.56  Consequently, the quality-of-
life improves from levels 1  ْto 4  ْ.  
 
Whether a level 1  ْ to 4  ْ is attributed to the conduct, depends on the temporal 
perspective taken.  von Hirsch and Jareborg adopt a one-year or slightly longer temporal 
perspective.57  This means that the relevant question in assessing the conduct is ‘How 
has your year been?’58 rather than ‘How was your day?’59 or ‘How was your last 
decade?’.60  It is asserted that these latter two expressions overrate or underrate the 
conduct.  
 
To link the levels in the table above with the generic-interest dimensions identified 
above, von Hirsch and Jareborg assert that physical integrity and material support and 
amenity may relate to all four levels in the table above.61  In contrast, freedom from 
humiliation, and privacy and autonomy develop at levels 2  ْto 4  ْin the table above.62  
The reason for this is that level 1  ْrelates to survival, and a person may survive without 
privacy or humiliation.63  After determining the relevant level in the table above, the 
                                                 
53  Ibid 18. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid 19. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid 22. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid 21. 
60  Ibid 22. 
61  Ibid 21. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Ibid 18. 
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next step is to map the level onto a harm gradation scale.64  The von Hirsch and 
Jareborg harm gradation table is set out below.65
 
Harm Gradation Living-Standard Level Intruded Upon 
I – grave Subsistence (living-standard level 1 )ْ 
II – serious Minimal well-being (level 2 )ْ 
III – upper-intermediate Adequate well-being (level 3 )ْ 
IV – lower-intermediate Enhanced well-being (level 4 )ْ 
V – lesser  Living standard not affected or only marginally so 
 
von Hirsch and Jareborg acknowledge that their living-standard analysis tool is not 
precise and requires judgment.66  They retreat on the issue of criminalisation by 
asserting that if a type of conduct constitutes grave harmfulness on the harm gradation 
table above, it ‘does not necessarily settle whether it should be proscribed’.67  In 
addition to considering harmfulness, they recommend that the legislature consider other 
factors in making the decision to criminalise conduct, for example, the social value of 
the conduct, the ability to enforce the criminal law and the impact the prohibition has on 
individual autonomy and privacy.68  They do not explore these factors and focus their 
discussion on harmfulness.  Similarly, in this article I will concentrate on the living-
standard analysis tool, and thus harmfulness.  A discussion of these other factors is 
beyond the scope of this article.  The living-standard analysis tool provides a systematic 
conceptual framework for gauging criminal harm rather than leaving it to guesswork.69  
Ashworth described the living-standard analysis tool as ‘pathbreaking’.70  While the 
living-standard analysis tool has not been applied in later sentencing literature or 
applied in making the decision to criminalise conduct, this article will fill this gap.  In 
particular, in this article I will proceed to apply the living-standard analysis tool to four 
examples of non-consensual photography and distribution to determine whether the 
examples should be criminalised. 
 
IV APPLICATION OF THE LIVING-STANARD ANALYSIS TOOL TO 
EXAMPLES OF NON-CONSENSUAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
In this article I will apply the living-standard analysis tool to four examples of non-
consensual photography.  The four examples are: (1) photographing a child playing in a 
public park; (2) photographing a topless female bather at a public beach; (3) up-skirt 
filming at a shopping centre; and (4) photographing a housemate as they shower in the 
bathroom.  I argue that, intuitively, photographing a housemate as they shower in the 
bathroom and up-skirt filming at a shopping centre, involve a greater intrusion on 
privacy71 (and thus more harm and a greater impact on a person’s living standard) than 
photographing a child playing in a public park or photographing a topless female bather 
at a public beach.  Consequently, my intuition suggests that if any of these examples 
                                                 
64  Ibid 29. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid 38. 
67  Ibid 4. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ashworth, above n 38, 37. 
71  See Rothenberg, above n 18; Calvert and Brown, above n 12; and McClurg, above n 18.  
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should be criminalised, it should be photographing a housemate as they shower in the 
bathroom and up-skirt filming at a shopping centre.  In any event, the living-standard 
analysis tool is more sophisticated than merely my intuition and it will be applied to 
each of these four examples. 
 
In the first example of photographing a child playing in a public park, the relevant 
interest dimensions are freedom from humiliation, and privacy and autonomy.  This 
article focuses on examples of non-consensual photography and this example assumes 
that the child and their parents (or guardian) do not expressly consent to the 
photography.  It also assumes that child has not impliedly consented to the photography 
merely because they are in a public place.  The living-standard analysis tool does not 
distinguish child victims from adult victims.  Physical integrity is not relevant in this 
example from a one year temporal perspective.  Note that this conclusion on physical 
integrity does not cover other types of conduct that may follow on from taking a 
photograph of a child, for example, kidnapping, torture, sexual assault or rape.  This 
conclusion on physical integrity in this example is consistent with von Hirsch and 
Jareborg’s example of assault.  More specifically, they assert that in an assault where 
the victim sustained substantial bruises and lacerations, but did not require 
hospitalisation, level 4  ْmay not be justified from a one-year temporal perspective.72  
Further, taking a photograph of a child playing in a public park does not involve 
material interests and thus the material support and amenity interest dimension is not 
relevant.  The freedom from humiliation and the privacy and autonomy interest 
dimensions in this example involve level 4  ْ because a child’s living-standard is not 
affected, from a one-year temporal perspective, if they had their photograph taken in a 
public place.  This conclusion on the freedom from humiliation interest dimension in 
this example is consistent with von Hirsch and Jareborg’s conclusion on forced rape and 
date rape, which involved level 2  ْbecause it is the norm in our culture that sexual acts 
are done with consent.73  Further, the conclusion in this example on privacy and 
autonomy is consistent with von Hirsch and Jareborg’s level 4  ْ attributed to a 
residential burglary where the home is not significantly disturbed74 and level 2  ْ to a 
residential burglary with ransacking.75  Taking a photograph of a child in a public place 
involves a lesser intrusion on privacy than an intrusion in a private place, such as a 
home, and thus the level attributed to this example cannot be more than level 4 .ْ  In 
summary, the living-standard analysis tool indicates that photographing a child playing 
in a public park results in an intrusion affecting enhanced well-being, that is, level 4 .ْ   
 
The same conclusion will be reached with respect to the second example, which is 
photographing a topless female bather at a public beach.  The living-standard analysis 
tool does not distinguish victims on the basis of gender.  Similarly, to the child 
photograph discussed above, this example of the topless female bather assumes that the 
female has not expressly consented to the photography or impliedly consented merely 
because she was in a public place.  For the same reasons as the example above, the 
physical integrity and the material support and amenity interest dimension are 
irrelevant.  Note that the conclusion on physical integrity does not canvass further 
conduct, where the photographer may stalk, sexually assault or rape the topless female 
                                                 
72  von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 13, 24. 
73  Ibid 26. 
74  Ibid 27. 
75  Ibid. 
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bather.  Photographing a topless female bather in a public place involves a lesser 
intrusion on privacy than the home invasions provided by von Hirsch and Jareborg, and 
mentioned above.  Consequently, level 4  ْ should be attributed to privacy and 
autonomy.  A couple of arguments could be made with regard to humiliation.  One 
argument is that if a female chooses to bath topless at a public beach, she would not be 
humiliated by another person observing or photographing her.  An alternative argument 
is that the topless female bather is content for surrounding people to observe her, but 
may not be content with the surrounding people making a permanent record of her in 
that state.  In any event, it is plausible that taking a photograph of a topless female 
bather at a public beach will only affect the female’s enhanced well-being and thus be a 
level 4 .ْ 
 
The third example considered in this article is up-skirt filming at a shopping centre.  As 
the living-standard analysis tool only applies to conduct where there is an identifiable 
victim,76 this article assumes that the subject of the up-skirt filming is identifiable.  This 
is possible when the subject has a ‘distinguishing tattoo, piercing or birthmark’.77  For 
the same reasons as discussed in examples one and two, the physical integrity and 
material support and amenity interest dimensions are irrelevant.  The privacy and 
autonomy and the humiliation interests dimension are rated at level 4  ْ as the 
photography intrusion has affected the subject’s enhanced well-being.  Attributing a 
level 1 ,ْ 2  ْor 3  ْ to up-skirt filming in a shopping centre is implausible considering 
that the living-standard analysis tool is used from a one-year temporal perspective. 
 
The fourth and final example involves photographing a housemate showering in the 
bathroom.  In this example, the housemate has not been made homeless and they have 
not lost any material possessions.  Thus, material support and amenity is not affected.  
Similarly, physical integrity is not affected, provided that the photographer merely 
wants to photograph the housemate showering and does not attempt to engage in sexual 
assault or rape.  This example intrudes on privacy and autonomy.  Arguably, it is more 
intrusive than three examples above because it occurs in a home.  The photographer has 
entered a space in the house (bathroom) uninvited and an analogy may be made with a 
burglar who enters a house uninvited.  As mentioned above, von Hirsch and Jareborg 
rated the intrusion on privacy and autonomy in a residential burglary with no ransacking 
at level 4 .ْ  Similarly, the privacy and autonomy intrusion in this example is level 4 .ْ  
With regard to humiliation, this example is more humiliating than examples one and 
two above, but arguably equal to example three, which also involves an intrusion into 
private body parts, albeit that example three occurs in a shopping centre (public place) 
and example four occurs in a home bathroom (private place).  Once again, the one-year 
temporal perspective would not justify a level 1 ,ْ 2  ْ or 3  ْ for humiliation in this 
example.  As mentioned above, von Hirsch and Jareborg attributed level 2  ْ to 
humiliation for forced rape and date rape.  Thus, it seems reasonable to award a much 
lower level, for example, level 4  ْ to a person who photographs their housemate 
showering. 
 
Arguably, a higher level of harm would occur if the photographer in the four examples 
above went further than merely taking the photograph, and distributed it on the Internet 
                                                 
76  von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 13, 3. 
77  Q Burrows, 'Scowl because you're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance' (1997) 31 
Valparaiso University Law Review 1079, 1125. 
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to a world wide audience.  In such a case, the rating for freedom from humiliation, and 
the privacy and autonomy interest dimensions may increase from level 4  ْto level 3  ْor 
2  ْ .  As mentioned above, the freedom from humiliation, and privacy and autonomy 
interest dimensions cannot be rated at 1 .ْ  These additional levels (level 3  ْ or 2  ْ ) 
include upper-intermediate and serious harm on the harm gradation table.  However, 
given that the distribution on the Internet is judged from a one-year temporal 
perspective, a lower level is more appropriate. 
 
As discussed above, the living-standard analysis tool rated all four examples of non-
consensual photography at level 4 .ْ  Presumably, it grouped the different types of non-
consensual photography together, because the tool was designed to deal with a range of 
offences, for example, homicide, armed robbery, burglary and date rape etc.  Thus, the 
living-standard analysis tool results did not match my intuition as set out above.  In 
particular, I speculated that the last two examples (up-skirt filming at a shopping centre 
and photographing a housemate as they shower in the bathroom) involved a greater 
intrusion into a person’s living-standard.  A level 4  ْ may be transferred to the harm 
gradation table at either IV or V, which represent lower-intermediate or lesser harms.  
von Hirsch and Jareborg did not indicate the point on the continuum (level 1  ْto 4 )ْ at 
which criminalisation of the conduct would be necessary.  Arguably, where the conduct 
impacts on subsistence and results in grave harm, there is a stronger basis for 
criminalising the conduct than where the conduct only marginally impacts on a person’s 
living-standard and results in a lesser harm.  Consequently, the application of the living-
standard analysis tool concludes that each of the four photography examples are at the 
lowest point on the continuum, that is, level 4  ْ.  If a dividing line was drawn across the 
four levels to separate conduct that should be criminalised from conduct that should not 
be criminalised, the four examples explored in this article are more likely to fall on the 
side of the dividing line where conduct should not be criminalised because they fall 
within level 4 .ْ  In such a case, the living-standard analysis would not support the 
criminalisation of these four examples of non-consensual photography and the 
following discussion will proceed on this basis. 
 
V COMPARING THE RESULTS OF THE LIVING-STANDARD ANALYSIS 
TOOL WITH THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The results from the living-standard analysis tool with respect to the four examples of 
non-consensual photography above will be compared to the criminal laws in 
Queensland, New South Wales, New Zealand and Canada.  Four jurisdictions have been 
chosen to determine whether there is a pattern in the way the four examples of non-
consensual photography are treated by the criminal law.  In relation to the first example, 
that is, photographing a child playing in a public park, it is not criminalised in 
Queensland, New South Wales, New Zealand or Canada.78  Additionally, the second 
example of photographing a topless female bather at a public beach is not criminalised 
in any of the four jurisdictions.79  For completeness, if the photograph of the child 
playing in a public park or the photograph of the topless female bather were distributed 
through the Internet, it would not be an offence in these four jurisdictions.  As the first 
two examples of non-consensual photography are not criminalised in the four 
                                                 
78  Refer generally to the offences in Criminal Code (Qld); Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW); Crimes 
Act 1961 (NZ); and the Criminal Code (Can). 
79  See the comment in the previous footnote. 
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jurisdictions, it follows that the criminal law (or lack of) is consistent with the results of 
the living-standard analysis tool, which indicated that the first two examples should not 
be criminalised. 
 
The criminalisation of the third and fourth example of non-consensual photography is 
more controversial.  As discussed above, the living-standard analysis tool suggested that 
up-skirt filming should not be criminalised.  This result is consistent with the criminal 
law position in New South Wales and Canada, which do not criminalise non-consensual 
up-skirt filming or the distribution of up-skirt filming images on the Internet.80  
However, non-consensual up-skirt filming is criminalised in Queensland and New 
Zealand.81  Further, the distribution of up-skirt filming images on the Internet is 
criminalised in Queensland and New Zealand.82  This means that the results of the 
living-standard analysis tool for up-skirt filming are not consistent with the criminal law 
position in Queensland and New Zealand.  With regard to up-skirt filming, the 
comparison between the living-standard analysis tool and the black letter criminal law 
could illustrate that (a) New South Wales and Canada have interpreted up-skirt filming 
in a similar fashion to the living-standard analysis tool, (b) Queensland and New 
Zealand have over-criminalised with respect to up-skirt filming, (c) drawing a line 
across the four levels in the living-standard analysis tool and concluding that if the 
conduct falls within level 4  ْ, it should not be criminalised, is flawed or (d) if it could 
be demonstrated that some types of conduct that fall within level 4  ْ should be 
criminalised, it could follow that New South Wales and Canada have under-criminalised 
with respect to up-skirt filming.  Similarly to example three, an inconsistency arises 
with respect to non-consensual photography example four, which is photographing a 
housemate as they shower in the bathroom.  As discussed above, the living-standard 
analysis tool suggested that this example should not be criminalised.  In contrast, 
Queensland, New South Wales, New Zealand and Canada criminalise this example of 
photography.83  All of these jurisdictions, barring New South Wales, also criminalise 
the distribution of such photographs.84  Once again, the inconsistency between the 
criminal law and the results of the living-standard analysis tool may be explained by 




Determining the boundaries of criminal law is a serious issue in an environment where 
criminal law is becoming more civilised.  The living-standard analysis tool provides a 
systematic framework for determining whether conduct should be criminalised or not, 
rather than leaving the decision to guesswork and intuition.   
 
The first two examples of non-consensual photography used in this article, that is, 
photographing a child playing in a public park and photographing a topless female 
bather, demonstrated consistent results between the criminal law in Queensland, New 
                                                 
80  See generally the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW); and the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ). 
81  Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A(2); and Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G(1)(b)(i). 
82  Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(1); and Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216J. 
83  Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A(1)(b)(ii); Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(1); Crimes Act 
1961 (NZ) s 216G(1)(a)(iii); and Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1)(b). 
84  Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(1); Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216J(1); and Criminal Code (Can) s 162(4).  
See the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) generally. 
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South Wales, New Zealand and Canada, and the living-standard analysis tool (drawing a 
line across at level 4 )ْ.  Both the criminal law and the living-standard analysis tool 
concluded that these two examples of non-consensual photography should not be 
criminalised.  The outcome that can be drawn from these two examples of non-
consensual photography is that the living-standard analysis tool offers an explanation of 
what should not be criminalised, which has been applied universally in these four 
jurisdictions. 
 
The third example of non-consensual photography, that is, up-skirt filming, casts doubt 
on the living-standard analysis tool at an explanatory level.  Drawing a line across the 
living-standard analysis tool at level 4  ْ suggested that up-skirt filming should not be 
criminalised.  This is consistent with the criminal law position in New South Wales and 
Canada, but inconsistent with the position in Queensland and New Zealand.  In this 
article I put forward several possible explanations for the difference between the results 
of drawing a line across the living-standard analysis tool at level 4  ْ and the criminal 
law.  These are (a) some jurisdictions and the living-standard analysis tool have 
interpreted the conduct similarly, (b) some jurisdictions have over-criminalised the 
conduct, (c) drawing a line across the four levels in the living-standard analysis tool and 
concluding that if the conduct falls within level 4  ْ , it should not be criminalised, is 
flawed or (d) if it could be demonstrated that some types of conduct that fall within 
level 4  ْ should be criminalised, it could follow that some jurisdictions have under-
criminalised the conduct.  Future research on criminalisation may benefit from a closer 
examination of where to draw the dividing line across the four levels to determine 
whether conduct should be criminalised or not.  Further, if it is determined that some 
types of conduct falling into level 4  ْshould be criminalised, while other types should 
not, criteria for separating these two categories needs to be developed.  Consequently, 
the third example of non-consensual photography demonstrates that living-standard 
analysis tool offers an explanation of what should not be criminalised, which has been 
applied by some jurisdictions.   
 
The fourth example of non-consensual photography of photographing a housemate 
showering in the bathroom, also demonstrated inconsistent results between the living-
standard analysis tool and the criminal law.  In particular, drawing a line across the 
living-standard analysis tool at level 4  ْ concluded that photographing a housemate 
showering in the bathroom should not be criminalised.  However, it is criminalised in all 
four jurisdictions.  This means that the living-standard analysis tool offers an 
explanation of what should not be criminalised, which was exceeded by the criminal 
law in all four jurisdictions.  Consequently, the living-standard analysis tool may be 
viewed ‘neither as ideal nor as explanation but rather as an ideological framework in 
terms of which policy debate about criminal law is expressed’.85  As an ‘ideological 
framework’,86 it facilitates legislative decision making in a criminal law context. 
 
 
                                                 
85  N Lacey, C Wells and O Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in Context 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2003) 9.  Note that this quote was originally used in the context of the 
harm principle rather than in the context of the living-standard analysis tool. 
86  Ibid. 
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